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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE

I.

The Amici refer the Court to their Motion for Leave to File Amici
Curiae Brief where the interests of the Amici are described.

II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The following facts are discussed in the parties' briefs and
supporting documents. Sean O'Dell was just 10 days past his 18th birthday
on the date of the crime for which he was convicted, rape of a child in the
second degree. At sentencing, Mr. O'Dell asked the court to impose an
exceptional sentence below the standard range based on his young age at
the time of the offense. The trial court denied his request. The Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 940 P.2d
633 (1997), precluded a departure based on age at the time ofthe offense.

State v. 0 'Dell, 180 Wn. App. I 044 (April 28, 2014) (unpublished).

III.

ISSUE TO BE ADDRESSED BY AMICI

Whether the Sentencing Reform Act, supported by current
scientific and legal views regarding youth, allows a court to consider
youth as an

offender~specific

trait which mitigates culpability, when

considering a request for an exceptional sentence downward.

IV.

INTRODUCTION

Recent neuroscience and precedent from the United States
Supreme Court demonstrate that young people have different

characteristics relevant to mitigation which should be considered during
criminal sentencing. While not all youth will be eligible for a downward
departure, the Sentencing Reform Act, RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e), grants
courts the authority to consider whether a particular defendant's youth
mitigated his individual culpability for a crime, even if, like Mr. O'Dell,
the young person has reached his 18th birthday.
In the last decade, the United States Supreme Court has handed
down four landmark decisions profoundly altering the treatment of youth
in the criminal justice system: Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct.
1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005) (abolishing the death penalty for all youth
under the age of 18); 1 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011,
176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010) (life without parole sentences for youth who
commit non-homicide crimes ruled unconstitutional),· J.D.B. v. North

Carolina,_ U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310 (2011) (holding
that the Miranda custody take into account the age of a juvenile); and

Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012)
(mandatory life without parole sentence for juveniles convicted of
homicide crimes is unconstitutional). Each ofthese cases was premised on

1

The Court had previously abolished the death penalty for juveniles under 16 at the time
of the crime. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702
(1998).

2

the scientific fact that adolescents as a group are neurologically,
significantly different than adults and therefore generally less culpable for
their crimes.
As the United States Supreme Court recognized in these cases,
neurological development affects how young people think and act. That
development impacts their understanding of consequences, their abilities
to control their emotions, the relative influence of peers, and their
decision-making. Recent neuroscience has proven that these
transformational processes continue well into a young person's twenties.
These scientific facts render many youth less culpable than adults due to
the innate qualities of their age and the manner in which those qualities
affect them.
Undoubtedly, a defendant's youth will not always result in a
downward departure- youth is not an excuse for criminal behavior.
However, it is relevant to a young person's culpability for a particular
crime and to the proportionality of the sentence.
Proportionate punishment for culpable behavior lies at the core of
the criminal justice system generally, and the Sentencing Reform Act
(SRA) specifically. See RCW 9.94A.010. The SRA allows a court to grant
an exceptional sentence downward when "[t]he defendant's capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct, or to conform his or her

3

conduct to the requirements of the law, was significantly impaired." RCW
9.94A.535(1 )(e).
This case illustrates this point. Because Mr. O'Dell was 10 days
beyond his 181h birthday at the time of the offense, his possible sentence
went from a maximum sentence of 36 weeks as a juvenile to a potential
life sentence. Nonetheless, the sentencing court felt that it could not
consider Mr. O'Dell's youth or the science discussed herein when it
sentenced him. In fact, the SRA grants courts the discretion to evaluate the
particular individual circumstances in cases like Sean O'Dell's in order to
reach a decision that reflects modern science and achieves a proportionate,
just outcome.
In the past, Washington courts have rejected the argument that
youth is a valid mitigating factor in cases that predate the scientific
breakthroughs in juvenile neuroscience discussed herein and the

Roper/Graham/Miller line of cases. See e.g., Ha'mim 132 Wn.2d at 836
(young age at time of offense not a valid basis for a downward departure).
This Court should reexamine those holdings and reach. a result more in
keeping with the language and intent of the SRA and one that
accommodates modern science and more recent legal thinking.
While a defendant's youth and its impact on his culpability for a
particular crime is one factor that courts should be able to consider during

4

sentencing, there are others as well. As the United States Supreme Court
has recognized, a defendant's intellectual disability may require a lesser
sentence than would otherwise be imposed. See e.g. Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304,

319~21,

122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002) (death

penalty may not be imposed upon person with intellectual disabilities and
IQ of 70 or below). The SRA reflects this principle and allows courts the
discretion necessary to reach a proportionate and just sentence in
particular circumstances.
In this brief, amici first offer an examination of the effects of
youthfulness on culpability. Second, amici show how the SRA allows
youth to be considered at sentencing on a case by case basis. Third, amici
discuss how other individual attributes, like the presence of an intellectual
disability, should also be the basis for a downward departure in particular
circumstances.

V.
A.

ARGUMENT

Until Their Mid~ Twenties, Youth Act Differently Than Older
Adults Because Their Brains Are Different.
The developing structures and processes within the adolescent

brain explain what every parent knows: young people are more reckless
and more susceptible to negative social pressures than they will be when
they reach full adulthood. Magnetic resonance imaging and other modern

5

technologies that allow neuroscientists to explore the inner workings of
the human brain have proven that neurological development continues
well into a person's twenties? While the rate at which this natural
developmental occurs and the impact it has varies from young person to
young person, this on-going development changes youth as a group from
foolhardy, risk-seeking teenagers into mature, more centered adults. As
explained by the American Medical Association: "Adolescents' behavioral
immaturity mirrors the anatomical immaturity of their brains. To a degree
never before understood, scientists can now demonstrate that adolescents
are immature not only to the observer's naked eye, but in the very fiber of
their brains." 3

I.

Changes in the Brain Change Behavior.

Neurological maturity requires the normal development of a
number of different regions and systems within the human brain. 4 Two

2

Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent Brain, 1021
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 77 (2004); Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of the Human
Cortical Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 Proc. Nat'l
Acad. Sci. 8174, 8177 (2004); cf, Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
3
Brief for the American Medical Association et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 10, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
4
The American Medical Association and the American Psychological Association both
filed amici curiae briefs in the United States Supreme Court during the pendency of the
Miller decision. These two briefs discuss the relevant psychosocial research and the
science of juvenile brain development in significant detail. See Brief for the American
Psychological Association et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Miller v.
Alabama,_ U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (hereinafter "APA Brief'); also, Brief for

6

structures have particular relevance to questions of criminal culpability,
the limbic system and the prefrontal cortex. The limbic system, which
includes the amygdala and the nucleus accumbensj is associated with
emotional and motivational processes and the "fight or flight" response. 5
The prefrontal cortex controls the "executive functions," including
emotional regulation, impulse controlj working memoryj risk assessment
and the ability to evaluate future consequences. 6 When fully developed, it
modulates impulsive behavioral urges emanating from the amygdala and
other structures of the limbic system. 7 The structures ofthe limbic system
lie deep within the brain and develop earlier and at a faster rate than does
the pre-frontal cortex. 8
Through adolescence and into early adulthood, the brain undergoes
a thinning process or "pruning". Redundant and cumbersome neural
connections within the brainjs gray matter begin to close down,
channeling electrical brain activity into fewer and stronger neural
the American Medical Association et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party,
Miller v. Alabama, _U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (hereinafter "AMA Brief').
5
Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect
Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. Am. Acad. Child & Adolescent
Psychiatry 1, 1 ( 1999).
6
Elizabeth Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in
Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 Nature Neurosci. 859, 860 (1999).
7
B.J. Casey & Kristina Caudle, The Teenage Brain: Self Control, 22(2) Current Direct.
In Psych. Sci. 82-87, 84 (2013).
8
Alexandra 0. Cohen & B.J. Casey, Rewiring Juvenile Justice: The Intersection of
Developmental Neuroscience and Legal Policy, 18 Trends in Cog. Sci. 63, 63 (Feb.
2014).

7

9

pathways. This pruning process occurs first in areas associated with the
limbic system and only later in the pre~frontal cortex, one of the last
regions to develop. 10
A second process aids the development ofthese stronger, more
efficient pathways. Fatty, white matter called myelin begins to surround
these developing pathways insulating them and allowing electrical
impulses to accelerate and flow more smoothly between regions of the
brain. 11 As these processes of pruning and myelination continue through
adolescence and into adulthood, the prefrontal cortex exercises more
control over the earlier developing, lower level regions of the brain.
The dynamic nature of this development accounts for a great deal
of the behavioral changes youth exhibit as they age. 12 Until fully reaching
mature adulthood, young people's behavior and decision making are more
heavily influenced by the amygdala and other more primitive neurological
regions. 13 A youth's reliance on these earlier developing regions results in

9

Sarah Durston eta!., Anatomical MRI of the Developing Human Brain: What Have We
Learned? 40 Am. Acad. Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 1012, 1014 (2001).
1
°Cohen & Casey, supra n. 8, at 63.
11
Elkhonon Goldberg, The Executive Brain: Frontal Lobes & The Civilized Mind, 144
(Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
12
See Neir Eshel et a!., Neural Substrates of Choice Selection in Adults and Adolescents,
45 Neuropsychologia 1270, 1270-1271 (2007); Kathryn Modecki, Addressing Gaps in
the Maturity of Judgment Literature: Age Differences and Delinquency, 32 Law & Hum.
Behav. 78, 79-80 (2008).
13
Cohen & Casey, supra n. 8, at 64.

8

an imbalance of the neurotransmitters that regulate pleasure and the desire
for rewards, dopamine and serotonin. 14 Higher dopamine levels produce
correspondingly stronger desires for immediate pleasure and gratification,
while their less developed neurological structures make youth less able to
resist these heightened urges.
The areas of the brain that regulate cognition and logic develop
relatively early in adolescence. 15 However, social and emotional maturity
continue to develop well into early adulthood with the developing prefrontal cortex. 16 In other words, teenagers have the neurological
foundation to support logical, rational thinking, but lack self-restraint and
the ability to fully comprehend consequences, especially in emotionallycharged settings. 17
Until full neurological maturity, young people in general have less
ability to control their emotions, clearly identify consequences, and make

14

Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 Ann. Rev.
Clinical Psycho!. 47, 54 (2008).
15
See Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial, 27 Law & Hum.
Behav. 333-334 (2003); Daniel Keating, Cognitive and Brain Development, in Handbook
ofAdolescent Psychology 45, 64 (Richard Lerner & Laurence Steinberg eds., 2d ed.
2004).
16
See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence, 18 Behav. Sci. & L. 741,756,758. (2000).
17
!d. at 743-745; Bonnie Halpern-Felsher & Elizabeth Cauffman, Costs and Benefits of a
Decision: Decision-Making Competence in Adolescents and Adults, 22 J. Applied
Developmental Psycho!., 264-271 (2001).

9

reasoned decisions than they will when they enter their late twenties and
beyond.

2.

Neurological development explains young people's
observable behaviors and in appropriate circumstances
mitigates their culpability.

Psychological studies and controlled observations ofyoung
people's behavior demonstrate that the same impulses to explore and
experiment that allow youth to learn also compel them towards risky,
sensation-seeking behaviors. Adolescents score significantly lower than
adults on assessments measuring "impulse control" and "suppression of
aggression." 18 Even youth who have developed cognitive abilities similar
to adults do not have the same ability to self-regulate their behaviors,
modulate their emotions or weigh the consequences of their actions. 19
The science proves that youth reduces culpability and is therefore
relevant to the sentence imposed upon an individual defendant. "[T]he
relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that the
signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the
impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can
subside." Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,
18

Cauffman & Steinberg, supra n.16 at 748-49,754 & tbl. 4; see also, Laurence
Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed in
Behavior and Self-Report, 44 Developmental Psycho!. 1764, 1774-76 (2008).
19
APA Brief at 8; also, Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile
Justice, 5 Ann. Rev. Clinical Psycho!. 47, 55-56 (2008).

10

368, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1993)). And so, young people
must be treated differently in some circumstances. "An offender's age is
relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail
to take defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be flawed."

Graham, 560 U.S. at 76. However, these transitory characteristics do not
require that all young people be treated differently in all circumstances.
Rather, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the relevance of
a defendant's age to a crime will vary by crime and by individual. Cf

Miller, 132 S.Ct. 2467 (requiring courts to consider "the character and
record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the offense," and
"the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors," including a
defendant's age, before sentencing a youth to life without parole). This is a
stance supported by the science.

20

However, the science also justifies

allowing a court to grant a young person an exceptional sentence
downward when it is warranted, even for an 18 year old or older
defendant.

20

B.J. Casey & Kristina Caudle, The Teenage Brain: Self Control, 22(2) Current Direct.
In Psych. Sci. 82-87, 83 (2013) (noting that though as a group adolescents show poor
self-control, there exist "striking differences" between individual adolescents in
emotional regulation and decision-making).

11

3.

Neurological development continues far beyond a person's
eighteenth birthday.

Eighteen does not represent a neurological milestone of any
consequence. The pruning and myelination processes continue well into a
young person's mid-twenties. 21 As the United States Supreme Court has
recognized, a young person like Sean O'Dell who was only 10 days
beyond his 18th birthday on the day of his crime is no more neurologically
developed than a young person 10 days short of her 18th birthday.
Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to
the objections always raised against categorical rules. The
qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not
disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token,
some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity
some adults will never reach.

Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. Long standing legal and societal views of early
adulthood track these biological facts.

22

According to recent findings, the human brain does not
reach full maturity until at least the mid-20s ... [T]he rental
car companies have it right. The brain isn't fully mature at
21

Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent Brain, 1021
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 77 (2004); Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of the Human
Cortical Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 Pro c. Nat'!
Acad. Sci. 8174, 8177 (2004); see generally, Brain Changes, MIT Young Adult
Development Project, http://hrweb.mit.edu/worklife/youngadult/brain.html (2008);
National Public Radio, Brain Maturity Extends Well Beyond Teen Years (2011) found at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=141164708 (last visited January
26, 2015); Lucy Wallis, Is 25 the New Cut-Off Point for Adulthood, BBC News
Magazine (September 23, 2013) found at http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-24173194
(last visited January 26, 2015).
22

See Petitioner's Suppl. Brief at 10-11 (discussing legal and social limitations on

behavior of young people before they turn 21 ).

12

16, when we are allowed to drive, or at 18, when we are
allowed to vote, or at 21, when we are allowed to drink, but
closer to 25, when we are allowed to rent a car. 23
Until a person reaches his mid-twenties, neurological immaturity
limits a young person's ability to control his emotions, consider
consequences and make reasoned decisions. And though brain
development plays out in different ways with different people, the
biological facts and the SRA support an exceptional sentence downward in
some instances.
B.

The SRA Permits Trial Courts The Discretion To Grant An
Exceptional Sentence Downward Because Of A Defendant's
Youth.
The SRA is a grid sentencing system, where the sentence is

generally determined based on the seriousness of the offense and the
defendant's criminal history. RCW 9.94A.530. While the legislature
intended to provide more structure to criminal sentencing when it passed
the SRA, it also ensured that trial courts retained the discretion to impose a
sentence outside of the standard range in appropriate circumstances. "The
purpose of [the SRA] is to make the criminal justice system accountable to
the public by developing a system for the sentencing of felony offenders

23

MIT Young Adult Development Project, Brain Changes,
http://hrweb.mit.edu/worklife/youngadult/brain.html (2008).

13

which structures, but does not eliminate, discretionary decisions affecting
sentences". RCW 9.94A.010 (emphasis added).
A trial court may impose a sentence outside the standard range for
an offense, "if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there
are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence."
RCW 9.94A.535. The SRA provides a non-exhaustive list of 10 statutory
mitigating factors which justify a departure from the standard range. !d.;

see also, State v. Vermillion, 66 Wn. App. 332, 832 P.2d 95 (1992).
Among these, RCW 9.94.535(1)(e) provides that lessened capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of one's behavior or to conform it to the law
is a mitigating factor. In drafting RCW 9.9A.935(1)(e), the Legislature
contemplated that offender-specific traits could mitigate the sentence.
As the foregoing discussion ofthe attributes of youth makes clear,
age may mitigate the culpability of individual defendants. The SRA's
language allows courts to consider these neurological and physiological
realities when sentencing a young person.Z 4
In considering an exceptional sentence outside the range, the
statute only requires the sentencing court to consider the purposes of the
24

Serious constitutional questions would arise if the SRA did not allow courts to
consider age as a mitigating factor in appropriate circumstances. Cf Miller, 132 S. Ct. at
2469; JDB, 131 U.S. at 2406 (finding that federal Constitution requires comis to consider
age when sentencing children to life without parole and when determining whether an
interrogation is custodial under Miranda).
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SRA, and whether the circumstances of the particular case are "substantial
and compelling," thus taking the case out of the realm of the "typical"
case. It is not the contention of amici that all or any personal
circumstances are valid mitigating factors. Instead, amici contend that
circumstances, like a defendant's young age, which mitigate culpability
should be considered in determining whether an exceptional sentence is
appropriate.
This case provides one illustration why trial courts must have
broader discretion to consider personal circumstances relating to the
culpability of the individual defendant during sentencing. Here, a young
man who had just turned 18 was convicted of rape of a child in the second
degree, facing a lengthy prison commitment pursuant to the standard
range. With no criminal history and no other current offenses, had the
offense occurred 11 days earlier, the presumptive disposition in juvenile
court would have been 15 to 36 weeks. RCW 13.40.0357. But 10 days
after his 18th birthday, the standard range presumptive sentence is 78 to
102 months (6.5 years to 8.5 years).
Furthermore, the presumptive sentence is merely a minimum term.
Given his crime, Mr. O'Dell faces a maximum sentence of life in prison.
RCW 9.94A.507(3)(requiring imposition of minimum term and statutory
maximum term of life upon conviction for certain sex offenses, including
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rape of a child in the second degree). Thus, with the passage of 11 days, an
adolescent went from a maximum sentence of 36 weeks in a juvenile
facility to a potential life sentence, without being given an opportunity to
ask the trial court to consider his young age at sentencing.
Science has demonstrated that the adolescent brain is not fully
developed at age 18, a developmental immaturity that leads some young
people to make different decisions than they will as fully mature adults.
And while a sentence within the SRA guidelines may be appropriate for
some young defendants, requiring courts to always ignore youth and
barring a mitigated sentence in every circumstance fails to serve the goals
ofthe SRA.
C.

Washington Courts Should Also Have The Discretion To Consider
Other Individual Personal Characteristics, Like Intellectual
Disability, That Significantly Mitigate A Defendant's Culpability.
Similarly, other personal traits, like intellectual disability, may also

significantly reduce an individual defendant's culpability such that a court
must consider them in order to reach a just and proportionate sentence.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized this principle. See e.g.,

Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. The reasoning underlying Miller and its
predecessors mirrors that the Court used in Atkins when it barred the
execution of intellectually disabled people with IQ's below 70.
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[P]ersons [with intellectual disabilities] frequently know
the difference between right and wrong and are competent
to stand trial. Because of their impairments, however, by
definition they have diminished capacities to understand
and process information, to communicate, to abstract from
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the
reactions of others. There is no evidence that they are more
likely to engage in criminal conduct than others, but there
is abundant evidence that they often act on impulse rather
than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group
settings they are followers rather than leaders. Their
deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal
sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.
I d. at 318 (emphasis added).

Very recently, in this context, the Court has endorsed the notion
that strict line drawing may create constitutional problems when criminal
sentencing is involved. In Hall v. Florida,

~U.S._,

134 S. Ct. 1986,

1993, 188 L. Ed. 2d 1007 (2014), the Court barred states from employing
a strict cut off of 70 IQ because "the reality that an individual's intellectual
functioning cannot be reduced to a single numerical score." Thus, just as
neurological maturity is not reached at 18, intellectual functioning cannot
be conclusively established by a single measure. A sentencing scheme
which precludes consideration of personal traits by setting strict,
universally applicable lines, ignores all of this.
Other sources also support granting courts such discretion. For
example, the American Bar Association Standards instructs sentencing
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courts to include personal circumstances of a defendant when determining
whether mitigating circumstances justify a departure from the guidelines.

Standard 18-6.3 Using presumptive sentences: mitigating
and aggravating factors and personal characteristics of
individual offenders; criminal history
(a) In determining the sentence of an offender, a
sentencing court should consider first the level of severity
and the types of sanctions that are consistent with the
presumptive sentence. The court should then consider any
modification indicated by factors aggravating or mitigating
the gravity of the offense or the degree of the offender's
culpability, by personal characteristics of an individual
offender that may be taken into account, or by the
offender's criminal history.
The ABA Criminal Justice Section Standards on Sentencing Standard 186.3. Like youth, other personal traits may significantly impact an
individual defendant's culpability; a principle the SRA explicitly
acknowledges. Judicial discretion should not be limited when it conflicts
with one of the SRA' s stated purposes.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The SRA mandates that a defendant's culpability be considered in
determining a fair sentence that is just and proportional to the crime. Brain
development research proves that many youth, including some young
adults, do not have the same capacity for reasoned decision making as
fully mature adults. In appropriate circumstances, these biological facts
are relevant to a particular individual's culpability for a particular crime.
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The SRA and science both require that courts be able to consider such
individual circumstances as a basis to grant an exceptional sentence
downward.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of January, 2015.
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